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Abstract 
 
We investigate profit-maximizing versioning plans for an information goods monopolist. 
The analysis employs data obtained from a web-based field experiment in which potential 
buyers were offered information goods in varied price-quality configurations. Maximum 
simulated likelihood (MSL) methods are used to estimate parameters describing the 
distribution of utility function parameters across potential buyers of the good. The 
resulting estimates are used to examine the impact of versioning on seller profits and 
market efficiency. 
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Confessions of an Internet Monopolist:  
Demand Estimation for a Versioned Information Good 
 
 The Internet has spurred the creation of new markets and changed the nature of 
competition in others. The ability of consumers to quickly and efficiently search over 
prices suggests that competitive pressures will be intense in retail markets with more than 
a few sellers of homogeneous goods. However, in markets that are monopolized or where 
product differentiation gives sellers protection from competition, the Internet provides 
sellers new opportunities to exploit market power through price discrimination. By 
tracking the online buying patterns of customers, sellers may be able to learn about buyer 
attributes and extract more of the surplus generated by trade.1 
 
 Price discrimination may be particularly important in information goods markets. 
Information goods are those that can be produced in a digital format; this frequently 
makes them suitable for sale and distribution via the Internet. Examples include textual 
matter, music and video entertainment, and software packages. Varian and Shapiro 
(1999) note that the production of information goods usually involves high fixed costs of 
development, but low marginal costs of reproduction. For example, the development of 
the first copy of the Windows XP operating system was very costly, but the cost of 
producing an additional copy on CD-ROM is close to zero. Information goods are not 
likely to be produced and sold in competitive markets. Competition drives prices toward 
marginal costs, but marginal cost pricing will not generate revenue adequate to cover the 
fixed costs of development. Instead, pricing is likely to be “value-based” (Varian and 
Shapiro, 1999). Successful producers of information goods will learn to extract more 
revenue from those who are willing to pay more. 
 
 Varian (2000) has shown that product versioning can, in effect, serve as a means 
of price discriminating in markets for information goods. By their nature, information 
goods are collections or bundles of data. Once an information good has been produced, it 
is possible to produce variants that differ in terms of the included content.2 For example, 
the “deluxe” version of a software package can be transformed into a “standard” version 
by the subtraction of features. Even if sellers cannot distinguish customers by 
“willingness-to-pay” a priori, appropriate versioning and pricing schemes can induce 
buyers to sort themselves via their purchase decisions. The result can be higher revenue 
and profit for the seller. 
                                                 
1 The problem of optimal price experimentation by a monopolist facing uncertain demand has been 
explored by Rothschild (1974) and Aghion, Bolton, Harris, and Julien (1991). Loginova and Taylor (2005) 
investigate incentives for monopoly experimentation when sellers can charge personalized prices. They 
find that learning by the monopolist is often thwarted by strategic behavior of buyers. Aquisti and Varian 
(2003) report similar results but also characterize circumstances in which conditioning prices on past 
purchase behavior can be profitable. Esteves (2005) finds that under duopoly, firms may eschew learning 
about the loyalties of individual buyers because subsequent price discrimination can lead to a more 
aggressively competitive outcome. 
2 The literature on information goods frequently refers to issues related to the “bundling” or “aggregation” 
of component goods (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 2000). Versioning can often be though of as a special 
instance of bundling in which lower quality versions (bundles) can be formed by subtracting components 
from versions (bundles) of higher quality. 
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 In this paper, we examine several aspects of product versioning. In section I, we 
review the analysis of Varian (1997) and extend his work by further characterizing 
demand conditions under which versioning will be profitable. Section II describes a 
general econometric method that can be used to estimate parameters of demand systems 
for versioned information goods. We have applied this method to an original data set that 
describes the behavior of potential buyers who were given opportunities to purchase 
versioned information goods (bundles of personalized digital images) in an online 
environment.3 Our data set was generated in a field experiment carried out by the authors 
using a “real-world” Internet business; the design of those experiments is described in 
section III of the paper.4 In section IV, econometric estimates are presented and 
discussed. Using these estimates, we design profit-maximizing versioning plans for the 
good, and we calculate how versioning affects seller profits and market efficiency. 
Conclusions follow in section V. 
 
I. Theoretical Background 
 
 In this section we begin by presenting a simple diagrammatic illustration of the 
versioning problem. This follows the example of Varian (2000). We then further consider 
the problem of characterizing conditions under which versioning might be profitable. 
 
Optimal Versioning: A Diagrammatic Approach 
 
 Following Varian (2000), we assume that there are two groups of customers 
(potential buyers) who differ in their willingness to pay for quality embodied in a single 
unit of an information good. We refer to these groups as “type 1” (low-demand) and 
“type 2” (high-demand) customers. Figure 1 illustrates the marginal valuation (of quality) 
schedules for individual members of these groups. Individuals’ total valuations are 
measured by the usual areas beneath the marginal valuation schedules. We assume that 
production of the good is costless, regardless of quality level. 
 
 Initially suppose that the single seller of the good can identify customers by type. 
For this case, type 1 customers would each be charged a price 1P  equal to area A for a 
version of the good with quality level 1S  and type 2 customers would be charged a price 
2P  equal to area A+B+C for a version with quality level 2S  (in each case, customers are 
charged a price equal to total willingness to pay). 
 
 Now suppose that the seller cannot observe a customer’s type. The seller might 
again consider producing versions with quality levels 1S  and 2S  to be sold at  prices 
1 AP =  and 2 A B CP = + + , hoping to extract all surplus from buyers. However, type 2 
                                                 
3 The Loginova-Taylor (cf. note 1) results suggest that one should be concerned with possible strategic 
behavior of buyers in such experiments. However, our experimental scenario was not one in which repeat 
buying or personalized pricing was either planned by the seller or likely to be exp ected by buyers. 
4 Harrison and List (2005) provide a survey of field experiments in economics and provide a comparative 
discussion of field and laboratory experiments. 
 3 
customers would not choose the bundle intended for them. By choosing the low-quality 
bundle, each high-demand customer can earn surplus equal to area B rather than a surplus 
of zero. Therefore, under this plan, the seller would earn only A from each customer.  
 
 However, the seller can do better. Suppose that the seller again charges 1P =A for 
a low quality good, but now charges a price 2P =A+C for the high quality good. Type 2 
buyers are just willing to buy the high quality version, since they now retain surplus B 
from the purchase of either version. The seller receives A from each type 1 buyer and 
A+C from each type 2 buyer. 
 
 From the seller’s viewpoint, this is an improvement, but is still not optimal. 
Suppose that the seller slightly reduces the quality of the low-quality version, as depicted 
in Figure 2. This reduces the revenue that can be obtained from a type 1 customer by the 
amount of the shaded triangle. However, because it makes the low quality version less 
attractive, it increases the willingness of type 2 customers to pay for the high quality 
version. The amount of the increase is measured by the area of the black trapezoid and, as 
the diagram shows, the gain from type 2 customers can exceed the loss from type 1 
customers. To select an optimal version, the seller would reduce the quality of the low-
quality version to the point where the marginal reduction in revenue from type 1 
customers just equals the marginal gain in revenue from type 2 customers. For the case 
where there are equal numbers of the two customer types, that occurs at quality level *1S  
in Figure 2.  
 
When is Versioning Profitable? 
 
 The preceding section demonstrates that versioning can be profitable when 
customers differ in their valuations of quality. However, the example relies on a special 
case where there are two distinct customer types with widely differing preferences. In this 
section we explore conditions required for the existence of a profitable versioning scheme 
for a particular class of buyer utility functions that we later employ in our empirical 
analysis. The results serve to emphasize that the preceding example from Varian is a very 
special one. 
 
We begin by considering the choice problem facing a potential buyer. The buyer 
has a utility function, bU VS= , which associates a gross valuation, U,  (measured in 
“dollars worth” units) with a versioned information good that has quality level  S.5 We 
assume that the utility function parameters satisfy the conditions 0V ³  and 0 1b£ £ .6 
Versioning will be profitable only when customers are not identical. We initially assume 
that customers differ only in terms of the parameter V, which is randomly distributed 
across customers according to a twice differentiable cumulative distribution function, 
                                                 
5 This particular utility function form is employed later in our empirical work; however, the theoretical 
results presented in this section generalize to utility functions of the form ( )U Vf S= , where ( )' 0f S > . 
6 These assumptions assure that the marginal utility of additional quality is non-negative and non-
increasing. The latter condition ( 0 1b£ £ )  is not necessary to establish the results presented in this section, 
but it does rule out other implausible implications; cf. note 35. 
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( )G V . The number of consumers is normalized to equal one and production costs are 
again assumed to equal zero. 
 
Consider first the case where the seller offers a single version of the good for sale. 
This version has quality S and is sold at a price P selected by the seller. For given S and 
P, an individual will buy if bVS P> , or, equivalently, / bV P S> . The fraction of 
customers satisfying the latter condition is given by 1 ( / )bG P S- , so the seller’s profit is: 
 
1 ( / )bP G P Sé ùP = -ë û  
 
The first order condition for this problem requires that the profit-maximizing price, *P , 
be chosen to satisfy:  
 
 
* * *
1 0b b b
P P P
G g
P S S S
é ùæ ö æ ö¶P
= - - =ê úç ÷ ç ÷¶ è ø è øë û
 
 
or 
 
  * *
1
( )h T
T
=  
 
where * * / bT P S= , and h and g respectively denote the hazard and density functions 
associa ted with the cumulative distribution G. 7 The second order conditions are satisfied 
provided that 0)(')(2 *** >+ TgTTg . 
  
We next consider the case where the monopolist offers two different versions of 
the good. Let 1S  be the quality of version 1 (the lower quality version), let 2S  be the 
quality of version 2 (the higher quality version), and let  1P  and 2P  be prices for those 
two versions. Each buyer maximizes utility by choosing to purchase either of two 
versions of the good, or neither. His/her choice may be summarized by the following set 
of conditions:   
 
If  1 1 0
bVS P- £  and 2 2 0
bVS P- £ , do not purchase;    (1a) 
 
If 1 1 0
bVS P- >  and 1 1 2 2
b bVS P VS P- ³ - , purchase version 1;   (1b) 
 
If 2 2 0
bVS P- >  and 2 2 1 1
b bVS P VS P- > - , purchase version 2.   (1c) 
 
                                                 
7 The hazard function is the ratio of the probability density function to the survival function, ( )/ 1g G- . 
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These conditions imply that a customer chooses the product version that yields greatest 
valuation net of price, or chooses not to buy if neither version offers a positive net 
valuation. Rewriting the above conditions in a more compact form we have: 
 
 If 1V T£  and 2V T£ , do not purchase; 
 
 If 1V T>  and 12V T³ , purchase version 1; 
 
 If 2V T>  and 12V T> ,  purchase version 2, 
 
where 1 1 1/
bT P S= , 2 2 2/
bT P S= , and ( ) ( )12 2 1 2 1/ b bT P P S S= - - . 
 
If versioning is to be a profitable strategy for the seller, then prices and versions 
must be selected so that there are positive sales of both versions. This requires that 
12 2 1T T T> >  or, in terms of prices and quality, that 2 1 1 2
b bP S PS> . The rationale for this 
requirement can be illustrated with a graphical argument. In Figure 3 we show the 
(positive) net utility gained by a buyer as a function of the parameter V. The steepest line 
(with slope 2
bS ) represents the net valuation obtained when the buyer consumes the 
higher quality version of the good, while the more gently sloped line (with slope 1
bS ) 
represents the net valuation obtained from the lower quality good. The point where the 
lines intersect identifies a buyer whose value of V leaves her indifferent to versions 1 and 
2. In the diagram, we illustrate the case where some buyers select each version, which 
clearly requires that 12 2 1T T T> > . Given this condition, the profit function for a versioning 
monopolist is: 
 
2 12 1 12 1[1 ( )] [ ( ) ( )]P G T P G T G TP = - + -   
 
and first order conditions are: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 112 12 1 12 1
1 2 1 2 1 1
b b b b b
P P P
g T G T G T g T g T
P S S S S S
¶P
= + - - -é ùë û¶ - -
=0  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 112 12 12
2 2 1 2 1
1 0b b b b
P P
G T g T g T
P S S S S
¶P
= - - + =é ùë û¶ - -
,    
 
or, after simplifying: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )12 12 12 1 1 1
1
0T g T G T G T T g T
P
¶P
= + - - =
¶
    (2a) 
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 ( ) ( )12 12 12
2
1 0G T T g T
P
¶P
= - - =
¶
.      (2b) 
 
Assuming an optimum exists, and letting asterisks denote values at the optimum, the 
latter condition simplifies to: 
 
 ( )*12 *
12
1
h T
T
= .         (3b) 
 
Using condition (2b) we know that ( ) ( )* * *12 12 121 G T T g T= + . Substituting this expression 
into (2a) and rearranging we obtain: 
 
( )*1 *
1
1
h T
T
= .         (3a) 
 
Note that conditions (3a) and (3b) require that the hazard function associated with the 
distribution G intersect the curve 1/x at two distinct points. Also, recall that the solution 
we obtained for the problem of a non-versioning seller also occurred at a point of 
intersection between h and 1/x. That point, *T , is distinct from 1T  and 12T . Therefore, for 
the case under consideration, a profitable versioning plan can exist only if the hazard 
function associated with G intersects the curve 1/x in at least three different locations. 
 
Well-known probability distributions fail to satisfy this requirement. These 
include all distributions with non-decreasing hazard rates8 (e.g., uniform, normal, logistic, 
extreme-value, chi-squared, Laplace, exponential distributions, and the Gamma and Beta 
distributions for a range of values of the parameters) as well as distributions with non-
increasing hazard rates (e.g., the Pareto distribution and the Gamma distribution for a 
range of values of the parameters). It is possible for hazard functions for other 
distributions, including the lognormal and Beta distributions, to intersect the function 1/x 
in three distinct points, but only for specific parameter values. We conclude that for 
utility functions of the form bU VS= ,  if V is random but b is not, then versioning will be 
profitable only when very special restrictive assumptions are made about the distribution 
of V.9 
 
Anticipating our subsequent empirical work, we can state this result a bit 
differently. For utility functions of the form bU VS= ,  if  V is uniformly distributed and b 
is non-random, then no profitable versioning plan exists. However, we can show by 
example that if b is random, then profitable versioning is possible. Consequently, a 
necessary condition for profitable versioning is that b be random. This has an implication 
                                                 
8  All log-concave distribution functions have increasing hazard functions. 
9 Jing (2000) reports similar results, finding that versioning is not profitable when g is log-concave and 
( ) ( )2 ' 0g x xg x+ > . Varian’s versioning example (replicated in section I of this paper) assumes that G is 
not a continuous function. 
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for empirical work—if we wish to investigate profitable versioning schemes, model 
specifications should be sufficiently general to permit randomness in both b and V. 
 
II. Econometric Method 
 
 Consider a sample of customers indexed by 1,...,i N= , each with a utility 
function of the form ibi iU V S= . Customers differ in their utility function parameters iV  
and ib , which are randomly distributed over the population. Let ( , , )i iG V b ? be the joint 
distribution function from which each individual’s utility function parameters are drawn, 
where ? is a vector of parameters characterizing that distribution. Further, assume that the 
purchase options that customers face are individual-specific. Each customer is presented 
with two versions of a good, with prices and quality levels given by 1iP , 2iP , 1iS  and 2iS . 
Utility maximizing purchase choices are determined as described in conditions (1). 
 
Let 0iR  be the probability that an arbitrary customer i chooses not to buy, given 
his choice opportunities (described by 1iP , 2iP , 1iS  and 2iS ) and given the distribution 
from which his utility function is drawn. Similarly, let  1iR  and 2iR  be the probabilities 
that customer i purchases versions 1 and 2, respectively. These probabilities depend upon 
the functional form of the distribution G, the parameters of the distribution, and the prices 
and qualities of the goods available for purchase by customer i. In equation form: 
  
( )0 0 1 2 1 2, , , ,i i i i iR R P P S S= ?        (4a) 
 
( )1 1 1 2 1 2, , , ,i i i i iR R P P S S= ?        (4b) 
 
( )2 2 1 2 1 2, , , ,i i i i iR R P P S S= ? .       (4c) 
 
As econometricians, we observe the actual choices made by buyers in the sample, as well 
as the options they chose from. Our task is to estimate the parameters ? ; to do so we 
wish to employ the maximum likelihood method. Denoting the observed purchase 
choices for buyer i by the dummy variables 0iC , 1iC , and 2iC , respectively indicating no 
purchase ( 0 1iC = ), purchase of version 1 ( 1 1iC = ), and purchase of version 2 ( 2 1iC = ), 
the likelihood function for an individual observation is given by:  
 
0 1 2
0 1 2
i i iC C C
i i i iL R R R= .        (5) 
 
The likelihood for the sample of observations is the product of the individual likelihoods:  
 
1
N
i
i
L L
=
= Õ .         (6) 
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The maximum likelihood method requires that we find values for ?  that maximize L. A 
number of algorithms are available for this numerical task. 
 
A difficulty with the estimation procedure outlined above is that it is not possible 
to derive closed-form solutions for the probability functions 0R , 1R , and 2R  in conditions 
(4) for all possible specifications for G. Moreover, it is not empirically desirable to limit 
forms for G to those for which analytical solutions for the probabilities are possible. 
However, it is possible to use the maximum likelihood method employing numerical 
rather than analytical calculations of probabilities. In the remainder of this section, we 
describe our implementation of a “maximum simulated likelihood” (MSL) method for 
estimation of our model. 10 
 
Consider customer i, who accounts for a single observation in a sample of size N. 
Also, consider arbitrarily selected values for ? , denoted 0? . From the distribution 
0( , , )i iG V b ? , draw a random sample of simulated observations, 1,..., sj N= ,  for jV  and 
jb . For each jV  and jb  drawn for customer i, determine what his choice would be when 
facing prices and versions 1iP , 2iP , 1iS  and 2iS . This is done by applying conditions (1) 
for each observation  j. This step yields a series of simulated choice outcomes, 0 jC , 1 jC , 
and 2 jC , for 1,..., sj N= . Given these series, we can approximate the probability that 
customer i will make choices in each of the three categories with the frequencies 
observed in the simulated sample. That is 
 
0
1
0
sN
j
j
i
s
C
R
N
=»
å
, 
1
1
1
sN
j
j
i
s
C
R
N
=»
å
, and 
2
1
2
sN
j
j
i
s
C
R
N
=»
å
. 
 
For sufficiently large values of sN , these approximations approach any desired level of 
accuracy. Using these values for 0iR , 1iR , and 2iR , one can calculate the likelihood for 
observation i given parameters 0?  using equation (5).  
 
Now repeat the procedure described in the preceding paragraph for each 
observation in the original sample, that is for 1,...,i N= . Doing so yields a value for the 
likelihood for each observation, and, using equation (6), a value of the likelihood function 
for the sample. We are therefore able to evaluate the likelihood function for arbitrary 
                                                 
10 Discussions of maximum simulated likelihood estimation are provided by Arias and Cox (1999), 
Gourieroux and Monfort (1993), Hajivassiliou and Rudd (1994), Lee (1995), Lerman and Manski (1981),  
Stern (1997), and Train (2003). As Train (2003, 242) notes, the approximation of probabilities in the MSL 
procedure introduces a bias in estimation; however, the bias diminishes as the number of draws used in 
simulation increases. Arias and Cox (1999) further note that when probabilities are approximated by 
frequencies, the simulated probabilities will not be continuous functions of the underlying parameters, and 
standard optimization algorithms for maximum likelihood estimation may fail. The use of large numbers of 
draws in simulation increases the smoothness of the simulated likelihood function and improves the 
performance of numerical optimization methods. 
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parameter values. The only remaining problem is to find parameter values that maximize 
the likelihood function, but conventional methods can be employed for this purpose.11 
 
III. A Market Experiment 
 
 This section describes a market experiment we have undertaken to investigate the 
demand for a versioned information good. The experiment was specifically designed to 
generate data suitable for the estimation method described in Section II. 
 
Introduction 
 
 The econometric method that we have described is very general; because it is 
simulation-based, there are essentially no restrictions imposed on permitted utility 
function forms or on the distributions from which utility function parameters are drawn. 
Data requirements are somewhat more demanding. We have assumed that we observe a 
sample of individual consumers’ choices, and that these consumers have been presented 
with varied price and quality options. For information goods sold via the Internet, such 
data may not be difficult for sellers to gather. For example, Amazon identifies its regular 
customers when they visit the site, keeps track of their purchase histories, and offers 
personalized suggestions for shopping. It would not be difficult to offer customers 
personalized prices (perhaps in the form of discount offers) on particular products in 
order to learn about demand characteristics.12 
 
 For academic researchers, obtaining such information is more difficult. Firms may 
be willing to experiment with prices and versions, but they are not likely to publicize 
their experiments or release the data they produce. The data employed in this paper were 
generated in a field experiment carried out by an existing Internet business, Homework 
Hero (www.homeworkhero.com). Homework Hero is operated by one of the authors of 
this paper (Chappell), who undertook the market experiment for the express purpose of 
obtaining data for academic use.13 
 
 Homework Hero is a service offered to K-12 schools that permits teachers to post 
homework assignments for their students on the web.14 Each teacher using the service 
maintains a web page on the Homework Hero site and can update assignments posted 
there through a web-based form. The service provided by Homework Hero is normally 
purchased by schools rather than by individual teachers. However, the market experiment 
                                                 
11 As we describe later (cf. footnote 33) we have modified the method described here slightly to take 
advantage of special features of our data and our empirical model.  
12 In fact, Amazon has carried out pricing experiments. In the summer of 2000 DVD prices were varied 
randomly to visitors in an experiment intended to provide information about customer demand (Wolverton, 
2000).  
13 Normally, when a firm undertakes a pricing experiment, it must weight the value of information gained 
against profits lost while offering suboptimal experimental prices. An advantage to being author-owners is 
that we were not concerned with revenues generated by the experiment. We agreed in advance to donate all 
revenues generated by the experiment to the Economics Department at the University of South Carolina. 
14 In September 2004, about 200 schools subscribed to the service, and about 5000 teacher pages existed. 
The site received about 100,000 unique visits and about 1.2 million “total hits” per week.  
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involved selling a complementary product, a collection of personalized digital images, 
directly to teachers. 
 
Experimental Design 
 
 The Homework Hero web site is organized so that each subscribing school has a 
set of school-specific pages and a database that holds the content of assignment pages for 
the school’s teachers. Within a school, each teacher’s assignment page uses a common 
template that determines the overall format of the page, but individual teachers provide 
page content. Teachers have options that permit them to post images and use HTML 
(Hypertext Markup Language) to create a personalized appearance.15 In practice, many 
teachers go to some effort to customize the appearance of their pages with both HTML 
formatting and the display of images.  
 
 In our experiment, we sold bundles of images for teachers to display on their 
assignment pages.16 Each of the images in a bundle included a graphic rendering of the 
teacher name, with the style, color scheme, animation, and theme of the images varying. 
Essentially, the image collections offered opportunities for personalization of a teacher 
page. Having multiple images would permit a teacher to vary the appearance of the page 
over time. Some of the bundles offered included images with seasonal themes, so it 
would be natural to display them in sequence over the academic year. Hereafter, we will 
assume that the quality of a bundle of images is given by the number of images it 
contains.17 The appendix to the paper displays several images from the collections 
offered for sale. 
 
Homework Hero has some market power in the sale of these image collections. 
The images sold were customized for use on Homework Hero and were personalized for 
buyers. Further, for the images to be displayed on a page, they must first be stored on the 
web, and Homework Hero provided storage space for the images sold. While it is 
possible for users to display other images on assignment pages, it would have been 
difficult for a teacher to replicate the product sold in the experiment. 
 
A total of 38 subscribing schools were selected for market experiments.18 The 
selected schools generally had large numbers of teachers actively maintaining assignment 
                                                 
15 There are actually two vintages of the Homework Hero server software that offer different options for 
displaying graphics. In the early vintage, teachers can only display graphics that have been previously 
posted elsewhere on the web. In the more recent vintage, teachers can upload a single graphic from their 
home computer to Homework Hero for display. Both software vintages were in use by schools included in 
the market experiment. 
16 Images were created by the authors using two software packages: Paint Shop Pro and Ulead Cool 3D. 
17 Because we know precisely which images were offered in each bundle, in principle we could investigate 
whether specific images were especially highly valued. Because overall sales rates were low, we have not 
attempted to refine the empirical models in this fashion. 
18 Some schools subscribe to a “non-commercial” version of the service that normally excludes all 
advertising from assignment pages. Because our experiments displayed ads viewed by teachers, site 
managers at these schools were notified in advance that ads would be displayed during a brief experiment 
undertaken for academic purposes. However, teachers viewing the ads would typically not have known that 
the sales offer was associated with a market experiment. 
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pages, but in other respects were similar to subscribing schools that were not selected. 
The specific image bundles and prices offered to teachers were common across teachers 
at a school, but varied across schools. There were two reasons for this. First, given the 
design of the Homework Hero web site, it was technically easy to customize offers to 
schools, but would have been difficult to vary offers to individual teachers.19 Second, we 
considered it undesirable to have teachers know that prices and options were being 
varied, and this would have been more apparent if offers were varied across teachers 
within a school.20  
 
At each school, the sale of images took place over an eight-day period, starting at 
9:00 pm on a Sunday and ending at 9:00 pm on a Monday. 21 All school experiments took 
place in the fall of 2004, however the experiments were not all conducted simultaneously. 
Experiments were run at several schools in every week in the interval from August 21 to 
October 25.22 At each school, teachers could choose to purchase either of two image 
bundles (or neither). The larger bundle always included all of the images in the smaller 
bundle, plus additional ones. The larger bundle was also always offered at a higher price 
than the smaller, however, per- image prices varied across versions and schools. Bundle 
sizes ranged from 1 to 12 images, and prices ranged from $0 to $10 across experiments; 
Table 1 provides additional summary data on the bundle sizes and prices offered, the 
number of teachers receiving offers, and the numbers buying high and low quality 
versions.23 
 
Apart from the specific offers, the mechanics of the experiments were the same 
across schools. Normally, when a teacher updates assignments on Homework Hero, he or 
she sees a screen that confirms a successful update and offers several options (view the 
updated page, update again, or follow links to other pages). When experiments were in 
progress, this screen also displayed an ad describing the image sales offer. The ad showed 
an example of a personalized graphic offered for sale and briefly described the sales 
options available (including numbers of images and prices for the offered collections). 
The ad also included hyperlinks to a more elaborate sales information page where 
teachers could browse through the images offered for sale and learn details of the product 
                                                 
19 In addition, Homework Hero’s privacy policy rules out the use of cookies that would identify an 
individual for purposes of offering an individual-specific price. 
20 Knowledge that prices varied could have caused some confusion and/or resentment among customers. 
Since Homework Hero is a “real” business, we wanted to avoid this possibility. In addition, the experiment 
should attempt to create conditions similar to those that would prevail in a post-experimental selling stage 
in a real business. Once an optimal versioning and pricing scheme is established by a firm, all customers 
would be presented with identical options. Because we offered uniform prices and options within schools, 
our experimental customers were placed in a similar environment.  
21 Experiments involving two schools were intentionally extended by a day because the normal end date fell 
on the Labor Day holiday. One experiment was inadvertently extended by 2 days because of an oversight 
by the authors. 
22 The work associated with selling and producing the products would have made it difficult for the authors 
to manage 36 experiments simultaneously. The staggering of school opening dates (from early August to 
mid-September) also led us to vary start dates for the experiments. We conducted the experiments early in 
the school year because teacher usage is heavy at this time. 
23 The number of distinct offers (35) is less than the number of schools (38) because several small schools 
were combined in identical treatments. 
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offer. Both the initial ad and the more detailed offer page made it clear that the offer 
would expire on a specified date. The detailed offer page indicated that group orders 
could not be accepted; only individual teachers were permitted to buy. The ad was altered 
to display a different sample image twice during each experiment. On the last day of the 
experiment, a bold red message emphasized that the sale would end at 9:00 pm that night. 
Throughout the experiment the sales offer was presented as ordinary commercial activity, 
without any mention of an experimental context.24 Teachers who purchased images 
retained the rights to employ those images on Homework Hero as long as their schools 
continued to subscribe to the service. 
 
When a teacher decided to buy, the order was placed by submitting a form on the 
web. Teachers could either pay immediately via credit card (using the PayPal transaction 
service) or pay later after we sent a bill in the mail.25 All teachers who ordered images 
eventually paid for them. Teachers who chose to purchase the smaller of the two 
available bundles were told that they could upgrade to the larger version at anytime 
within the experimental period; however, only one buyer chose to do so.  
 
Once an order was completed, the authors produced the image bundles by editing 
the displayed name in previously designed image templates. The images were stored on 
the Homework Hero server and purchasers were notified of the URLs (web addresses) for 
the images. By pasting a URL into the appropriate entry box on the usual Homework 
Hero assignment update form, a teacher could display a image on his assignment page. 
Later, by changing a single number in the URL pasted in the form, a teacher could 
display an alternative image from the collection. 
 
Summary Data 
 
Across all participating schools, a total of 1440 teacher assignment pages were 
updated in the course of the experiment.26 We could identify the owner of each of those 
pages, and therefore could determine the identities of all teachers who viewed the initial 
ad describing the sales offer.27 Of these 1440 teachers, ultimately 33 teachers purchased 
image collections, including 11 who “purchased” bundles that were priced at zero. Total 
revenue from the experiment ’s sales was $62.00. 
 
Obviously, purchases were infrequent, but the low sales frequency should not be 
surprising. Teachers do not come to Homework Hero intending to make purchases; i.e., 
they are not shoppers, a priori. The offer they see is in the form of a banner ad, 
                                                 
24 An exception has been noted (cf. note 18), however, most teachers would not have known about the 
experimental nature of the offer. 
25 Because teachers often update pages in short periods of time between class periods, we felt that it would 
be helpful to keep the purchase process as simple as possible. Since credit card forms are sometimes 
cumbersome, we offered the “pay later” option. 
26 Pages for clubs, sports teams, other organizations, or pages maintained by groups of more than two 
teachers were excluded from the sample. None of the individuals maintaining these pages ordered image 
bundles during the experiment. 
27 Unfortunately, we were not able to unambiguously determine which teachers clicked to proceed to the 
detailed sales offer page. 
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augmented with a brief textual message. Click-through rates on banner ads displayed on 
the web are generally low—according to a March 2000 report, the Internet-wide average 
click-through rate was 0.38%, and sales rates are necessarily lower than click-through 
rates.28 With a sales rate at about 2% of the overall audience, our results substantially 
outperform the Internet average for banner advertising. 29 This also is not surprising—the 
product was targeted to an audience that should have been receptive (since all ad 
recipients were already Homework Hero users). Nevertheless the paucity of sales limits 
the scope of the empirical investigation that can be undertaken. 
 
 Using the data obtained from experiments, our purpose is to devise a profit-
maximizing versioning and pricing plan. It is a characteristic of versioning schemes that 
prices not vary across identifiable groups or individuals. Instead, all individuals are 
presented with identical options and they sort themselves through their purchase 
decisions. Given our intentions, we purposely refrain from using individual- and group-
specific data in estimation of the demand system.  
 
 For other purposes, having knowledge of how individual teacher characteristics 
affect purchase decisions could be useful, and, in the course of our work, we have 
collected data to describe some of these characteristics. 30 For example, teacher 
assignment pages usually reveal grade levels and subject areas taught, and whether a 
teacher was male or female. Assignment pages also give some quantifiable indications of 
the willingness of teachers to produce a customized web page. For example, we can 
observe whether teachers had posted images or used customized HTML on their page 
prior to the experiment. We can also obtain data describing attributes of the school where 
each teacher was employed (student population, grade leve ls, public or private status, 
religious affiliations, etc.) and demographic information for geographic areas in which 
specific schools are located. 
 
 In the following section, we will present econometric results that employ the 
methods described in section II. However, as a preliminary empirical exercise, we have 
estimated a simple conditional logit model using our data. This model specifies that 
customer choices depend upon the qualities and prices of the offered bundles. The results 
in Table 2 reveal that both price and quality (number of images) are related to customer 
choices in an expected fashion—a lower price and a higher quality level make a bundle 
more attractive and therefore increase the probability that it will be purchased. 
Coefficients for both price and quality differ significantly from zero in the appropriate 
directions. While the logit specification is inappropriate for our purposes, it is reassuring 
                                                 
28  See http://www.consult-x.com/papers/webpromotion-bannerads.htm. Hoffman and Novak (2000) quote 
an earlier ( 1999) CyberAtlas report showing an average click-through rate of 0.58%. 
29 More than 10% of the target population clicked-through the initial ad at some point during the 
experiment (based on 156 recorded “hits” on the sales page banner and a population of 1440 teachers who 
updated pages in the experimental period). About one-fifth of those who clicked through ultimately 
purchased. 
30 For example, one might wish to design third degree price discrimination schemes as well as versioning 
schemes. 
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to see that price and quality exhibit expected impacts on customer choices when this 
well-known empirical model is estimated.31 
 
 
IV. Econometric Results 
 
Using the method described in Section II, we will estimate parameters 
characterizing the distribution of individual teachers’ utility functions. Each teacher i is 
assumed to have a utility function of the form ibi iU V S= , where iV  and ib  are random 
variables drawn from a distribution ( , , )i iG V b ? . The quality of a bundle, S, is measured 
by the number of images it contains.32 Although it would be possible to employ any of a 
wide range of distributions for G, we begin by using a specific simple distribution. We 
assume that iV  is uniformly distributed from 0 to maxV  ( max 0V > ) but with a mass of 
probability at 0iV = . The probability that 0iV =  is indicated by parameter 0M . We also 
assume that ib  is uniformly distributed from lob  to hib  (where 0 1lo hib b£ < £ ) and that 
the distributions for iV  and ib  are independent. Our problem is to find MSL estimates of 
the parameters maxV , 0M , lob , and hib .
33 To insure accuracy of our estimates and 
smoothness of the simulated likelihood function, we set 1,000,000sN =  (in evaluating 
the likelihood function, sN  is the number of simulated observations used in calculating a 
probability for each observation in the original data).34 
 
Two sets of model estimates are presented in Table 3. The estimations differ only 
in terms of restrictions imposed on the coefficients. Model 1 imposes no restrictions on 
coefficient values, but yields estimates of lob  and hib  that are outside of theoretically 
specified limits (the estimated value for lob  is less than zero and that for  hib  is greater 
                                                 
31 Most importantly, the logit model apparently precludes profitable versioning (we have found no 
profitable versioning plans and conjecture that this is a general result). In addition, the random utility 
specification underlying the logit model contains only a single an additive random error term that varies 
across choices as well as individuals. This assumption permits some peculiar outcomes in the context of our 
application. For example, a buyer might choose a smaller bundle when offered a larger bundle (that 
includes the smaller as a subset) even when the larger bundle is offered at a lower price.  
32 Because we have recorded more detailed information on the composition of bundles, it might be possible 
to be more general in defining quality. However, given the limited number of observed purchases, we have 
not pursued this possibility. 
33 Our estimation procedure for this application differs slightly from that described earlier in order to take 
advantage of special features of our model and data. First, when there is a mass point of probability for 
0iV = , it is only necessary to simulate choices over the range of positive values for iV . Second, because all 
price and version options were identical across teachers in a school, and because we do not include any 
individual-specific variables, there are a small number of possible values for the likelihood function for any 
observation. It is not necessarily to simulate for each observation separately, since many observations 
within a given school are identical from an econometric perspective. 
34 We employed the MLPROC procedure in TSP 4.5 to implement this method. 
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than one).35 Although the point estimates are outside the bounds suggested by theory, 
neither differs significantly from its theoretically prescribed limit.36 Model 2 imposes the 
theoretical restriction that 0 1lo hib b£ < £  (by setting 0lob =  and 1.0hib = ). In principle, it 
would be possible to further restrict the model so that lo hib b= , implying that ib  is non-
random (and, from Section I, that no versioning scheme is possible). However, 
imposition of this restriction leads our model to imply that some observed choice patterns 
should occur with probability zero, and we therefore rule out this case.37 
 
Although the uniform distributions assumed for iV  and ib  are plausible, it would 
be desirable to adopt a more general specification. The Beta distribution is an attractive 
option for this purpose for two reasons. First, it is flexible. Depending on parameter 
values, the beta probability density function can have any of a variety of shapes. Second, 
the uniform is a special case of the Beta distribution, so the hypothesis that a distribution 
is uniform can be tested as a restriction in a more general model.  
 
Uniform and Beta distributions share parameters that determine upper and lower 
bounds, however, the Beta distribution has two additional “shape” parameters, denoted 
a  and b . Permitting both iV  and ib  to have Beta rather than uniform distributions 
therefore requires that four additional parameters be estimated. When we attempted to 
estimate this more general specification, TSP’s maximization algorithm failed to 
converge. We then searched over a grid of Beta distribution shape parameters, letting 
each of the shape parameters vary between 0.25 and 2.0 at intervals of 0.25. Table 4 
reports estimates of the model for the best values of the shape parameters. Based on these 
results, a likelihood ratio test fails to reject the restrictions imposed by the uniform 
distribution for either iV  or ib ; consequently, we maintain the assumption of uniform 
distributions in the remainder of our work.38 
 
We now focus on the parameter estimates for Model 2 in Table 3, where uniform 
distributions are assumed and the restrictions 0lob =  and 1.0hib =  are imposed. In this 
estimation, the mass point coefficient, 0M , has a value of 0.96, implying that 96% of the 
teachers had zero valuations for image bundles. Given that only about 2% of the sample 
actually purchased a bundle, this seems to be a reasonable estimate (teachers who ignored 
the ads, regardless of the reason, are appropriately considered to have zero valuations).39 
                                                 
35 A negative value for b implies that the marginal utility of quality is negative, while a value of b greater 
than one implies that the marginal utility of quality is rising. In the latter case, if images could be added to a 
bundle at a constant cost, then the profits from selling to a single customer would be unbounded. 
36 A likelihood ratio test also fails to reject the joint hypothesis that 0l ob =  and 1.0hib = ; specifically, 
( )2 2.051.067 5.99 2c c= < = . 
37 For some price-bundle configurations, the model implies that one bundle should dominate the other for 
all customers. However, in the data, some customers choose each bundle. 
38 Treating the best shape parameters obtained in the grid search as those maximizing logL, the test results 
are: ( )2 2.053.36 9.49 4c c= < = ; we fail to reject the hypothesis of uniform distributions. 
39 This result does reveal the importance attached to getting the attention of potential customers, apart from 
selecting profit-maximizing versions and prices. 
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A buyer with median values of iV  and ib  (for buyers with iV  positive) would have a total 
valuation of $3.08 for a 12-image bundle. Given that all bundle sales took place at prices 
between $0 and $5, this result also appear to be reasonable.  
 
Next we consider the problem of determining a profit maximizing versioning and 
pricing plan, given the demand system estimates for Model 2. For simplicity, we will 
continue to consider plans that offer just two versions of the good. In the optimal plan the 
large bundle necessarily includes all 12 images (given that we assume that marginal 
production cost is zero). We wish to determine the optimal size of the smaller bundle, 1S , 
and prices for both small and large bundles, 1P  and 2P .  
 
To calculate the profitability of any plan, we again employ simulation methods. 
For given 1S , 1P , and 2P  we draw a large number (10,000) of customers from the 
estimated distribution of utility functions. For each simulated customer, we determine a 
purchase choice (no purchase, purchase the small bundle, purchase the large bundle) and 
the profit generated by that purchase choice. We then average profits across all 10,000 
simulated customers and repeat this procedure for different values of 1S , 1P , and 2P . 
After examining all feasible plans, we determine which one yields the highest profit per 
customer.40 In this exercise, we simulate only customers with positive iV  values (those 
with zero values for iV  would not purchase at any positive price and are irrelevant for the 
profit maximization calculation). 
 
Results of this exercise, summarized in Table 5, show that the optimal versioning 
plan has 1 2S = ,  2 12S = , 1 $1.28P =  and 2 $4.84P = , and yields profits per customer (for 
customers with non-zero valuations) of $1.56. To compare these outcomes to those that 
would prevail in the absence of versioning, we repeated the simulation described above, 
but assumed that only the large bundle was sold at a single “monopoly” price. Results in 
Table 5 show that the profit-maximizing single-version price of $4.30 produces a profit 
per customer of $1.42. Consequently, optimal versioning increases profit per customer by 
11.3% over single-version monopoly pricing. In our experiment, actual revenues obtained 
from 1440 teachers who updated pages totaled $62.00. Our results imply that if we had 
instead set an optimal price for a single version, our expected revenue would have been 
$81.79. Had we imposed the optimal two-version package and pricing scheme, revenue 
would have risen further to $91.01.41 These are small amounts, but similar percentage 
changes would imply huge benefits for large firms 
 
Our results also have implications regarding the welfare consequences of 
versioning. Table 5 reports that total surplus per customer increases from $2.76 under 
single-product monopoly to $2.84 under versioning (an increase of 2.9%). Versioning 
increases profits and decreases consumer surplus compared to single-version monopoly, 
                                                 
40 We consider only integer values for 
1S  . 
41 Of 1440 teachers, only 57.6 (4.00%) are estimated to have had positive valuations. Multiplying 57.6 by 
profits per customer yields these amounts. 
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but the profit increase is slightly greater than the loss of consumer surplus. The increase 
in overall welfare is associated with a large increase in the number of customers served. 
Table 5 shows that 51.0% of customers with non-zero valuations make a purchase under 
profit-maximizing versioning, while only 33.0% buy under the single-version monopoly 
regime. Of course many who buy under the versioning scenario receive a product of less 
than optimal quality. 
 
Results from versioning and non-versioning monopoly scenarios can also be 
compared to a welfare maximizing outcome. Assuming marginal cost of zero, the welfare 
maximum would give each customer the maximum sized bundle of 12 images, resulting 
in a total surplus of $3.99 per customer, a welfare gain of 39.0% over optimal versioning. 
With or without versioning, the welfare cost associated with monopoly pricing is 
substantial. 
 
V. Conclusions  
 
Information goods are commonly sold in quality differentiated versions. With 
appropriately designed versions and prices, this practice can generate profits as customers 
sort themselves by willingness-to-pay when choosing which versions to purchase. 
However, to exploit profitable versioning opportunities, producers must have knowledge 
of the distribution of preferences across the population of potential buyers. 
 
We have employed an econometric method that permits us to use data from 
pricing experiments to characterize distributions of customer preferences. We have 
applied the method to data obtained from an experiment in which we varied versions and 
prices of an information good sold via the Internet (the good consisted of a bundle of 
personalized digital images intended for display on web pages). For this application we 
were able to construct profit-maximizing versioning and pricing schemes. Profit-
maximizing versioning increased expected profits to the seller by 11.3 % relative to a 
comparable single-version monopoly plan. Total welfare increased slightly under 
versioning, as more customers were served. 
 
Versioning is a common practice, and firms who engage in versioning often have 
opportunities to experiment with prices in order to learn about demand. Information 
services and software products provide many examples of versioning, but the practice is 
common in other product markets as well. For example, wireless phone and cable 
television services come in alternative versions (i.e., service plans). Fees for plans can be 
varied over locations or over time and detailed information on usage patterns can be 
obtained from customers. The problem of how to use this information to devise service 
options and set prices is one that might be analyzed using methods similar to those 
described in this paper.
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Table 1. Experimental Bundle and Price Configurations  
 
1S  2S  1P  2P  
 
Number of 
Teachers 
 
 
Number 
Buying #1 
 
 
Number 
Buying #2 
 
       
1 5 1.00 5.00 21 0 0 
1 7 1.00 5.00 22 0 0 
1 8 0.00 4.00 23 2 1 
1 9 0.00 7.00 19 1 0 
2 6 0.00 1.00 58 0 1 
2 7 0.00 5.00 26 0 0 
2 9 1.00 3.00 153 0 2 
2 11 1.00 3.00 77 0 0 
2 12 1.00 4.00 39 1 0 
2 12 3.00 10.00 42 0 0 
3 6 3.00 6.00 26 0 0 
3 7 2.00 4.00 30 0 0 
3 8 1.00 2.00 25 0 0 
3 10 0.00 1.00 18 2 0 
3 10 0.00 3.00 20 0 0 
3 11 2.00 4.00 54 0 3 
3 12 0.00 3.00 23 3 1 
3 12 2.00 8.00 13 0 0 
4 8 1.00 4.00 46 2 0 
4 9 2.00 5.00 86 1 0 
4 10 0.00 2.00 44 1 0 
4 10 0.00 1.00 20 1 2 
4 11 1.00 2.00 98 1 0 
4 11 2.00 4.00 34 0 0 
5 8 4.00 5.00 16 0 0 
5 8 5.00 8.00 35 0 0 
5 10 5.00 9.00 22 0 0 
5 12 2.00 4.00 20 0 1 
5 12 3.00 5.00 165 1 2 
5 12 3.00 5.00 13 0 0 
5 12 3.00 5.00 16 0 0 
6 9 3.00 4.00 32 0 0 
6 11 3.00 6.00 35 0 0 
7 10 1.00 2.00 31 0 0 
7 12 0.00 3.00 38 1 3 
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Table 2. Conditional Logit Estimates 
Standard errors in parentheses  
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Coefficient 
  
Constant -4.3599 
(0.3012) 
 
S 0.1753 
(0.0641) 
 
P -0.5703 
(0.1799) 
 
logL 
  
-172.21 
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Table 3. Model Estimates 
Standard errors in parentheses  
 
 
Parameter 
 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
0M  0.9544 
(0.0088) 
 
0.9600 
(0.0068) 
maxV  1.7486 
(0.4690) 
 
1.7968 
(0.3221) 
lob  -0.8925 
(0.9617) 
 
0.0000† 
hib  1.3434 
(0.2436) 
 
1.0000† 
logL -171.8391 -172.3724 
   
 
  †Coefficient constrained to equal the indicated value. 
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Table 4. Model Estimates Assuming Beta Distributions  
Standard errors in parentheses  
 
 
Parameter 
 
 
Coefficient 
  
0M  0.9506 
(0.0091) 
  
maxV  3.0085 
(0.9869) 
  
lob
† 0.00 
hib
† 1.00 
  
Shape Parameters for iV
††  
a  1.00 
b  0.75 
  
Shape Parameters for ib
††  
a  0.50 
b  1.25 
  
logL -170.69 
 
 
†Coefficient constrained to equal the indicated value. 
††Coefficient obtained via grid search. 
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Table 5. Profit and Welfare Consequences of Versioning 
 
  
Optimal 
Versioning 
 
 
Single Price 
Monopoly 
 
 
Welfare 
Maximum 
 
    
1N  2 NA NA 
1P  $1.28 NA NA 
2N  12 12 12 
2P  $4.84 $4.30 $0.00 
% Purchasing Version 1† 24.9% NA NA 
% Purchasing Version 2† 26.1% 33.0% 100.0% 
Profit per Customer† $1.58 $1.42 $0.00 
Consumer Surplus per 
Customer† 
$1.29 $1.36 $3.99 
Total Surplus per 
Customer† 
$2.87 $2.78 $3.99 
 
†Averaged only over customers with non-zero valuations. 
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Figure 1. Optimal Versioning
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Figure 2. Optimal Versioning
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Figure 3. Net Utility for Two Versions of a Good
T1 T2 T12
Net Utility
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Appendix 
Sample Images Included in Sale Bundles 
(Some images were animated)  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
